

The financial architecture and control measures of the financial institutions

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1. Introduction

- ▶ In the aftermath of the crisis, ambitious reforms have been launched:
 - they concern all financial system stakeholders (financial institutions, credit-rating agencies, mutual investment funds, prudential supervisory authorities, etc.)
 - they target all stages at which risks are taken
 - normal periods during which there could be excessive risk-taking
 - crisis period during which risks materialise
 - they target not only prudential rules, but also the whole financial architecture

- ▶ The three main lines of the presentation
 - oversight: strengthening the prudential supervision framework
 - prevention: tightening up the requirements on the financial sector
 - intervention: reinforcing the crisis management framework



2. Strengthening the prudential supervision framework

- ▶ Tension between:
 - the micro-prudential approach of national supervisors
 - global and systemic nature of crises→ need to tighten up the macro-prudential approach

- ▶ How can the macro-prudential approach be reinforced?
 - by defining instruments to make macro-prudential policy more operational
 - striking a balance between macro-prudential supervision and market integration
 - on a geographic basis
 - at sectoral level

- ▶ Reforms underway
 - At European level: European Systemic Risk Board being set up
 - At Belgian level: implementation of twin peaks model



3. Tightening up the requirements on the financial sector

► Re-regulation process

- aiming to strengthen credit institutions' capital base and liquidity reserves: for example, Basel III
 - core own funds: from 2% at the moment to 4.5% in 2015
 - capital conservation buffer: 2.5% from 2019 onwards
- harder to negotiate in a multipolar context
 - risk of ending up with just the lowest common denominator
 - may require local complements (e.g. governance in Europe, Volcker Rule in the United States, etc.)
- involving a lobby pointing up the costs
 - i.e. cost for financial institutions and possible repercussions for growth
 - Conversely, some studies show that the cost is only temporary and quite small compared with the collective benefit (see Cecchetti, 2010, Admati et al., 2010)



4. Reinforcing the crisis management framework

- ▶ Reinforcing the crisis management framework is essential...
 - whatever the prudential requirements, the chance of a crisis occurring can never be ruled out
 - crisis management mechanisms have an influence on the way in which stakeholders behave in normal times

- ▶ ...but extremely difficult:
 - since highly technical subjects are involved:
 - for example: harmonising the power of banking resolution authorities, bankruptcy laws, etc.
 - with implications for cost-sharing
 - with the private sector:
 - how can costs be imposed on the private sector before the State intervenes?: bail in, contingent capital, etc.
 - between authorities from different countries
 - repercussions for allocating supervisory tasks and responsibilities



5. Conclusions

- ▶ Essential to tackle the whole issue and to work on the three axes at the same time
 - Prevention
 - Supervision
 - Crisis management
- ▶ Arduous work because there is a lot of resistance
 - coming from the financial sector
 - which is mixing up defence of its own interests with the collective interest (capacity to finance the economy, for instance)
 - and from the national authorities
 - that have to act within the limits set by their national legislative framework
 - that represent national interests
 - anxious to defend their powers
- ▶ The reforms therefore have to be born out of compromises that must draw the line between private and collective interests, while giving priority to the common good

